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196 Neb. 441, 243 N.W.2d 341 (1976).
I. INTRODUCTION
Subrogation is an important concept in insurance law. There
are several reasons why an insurer which has paid for a loss should
be allowed to recover from those legally responsible. First, the in-
sured is prevented from recovering twice for the same loss, pre-
serving the principle of indemnity.' Second, the insurer is reim-
bursed for the payment it has made. Third, the tort-feasor, who
is legally responsible, is prevented from receiving a windfall by
being absolved of liability. "Stated simply, subrogation is a crea-
ture of equity having for its purpose the working out of an equi-
table adjustment between the parties by securing the ultimate dis-
charge of a debt by the person who in equity and good conscience
ought to pay it.
' '2
In Stetina v. State Farm Mutual Automibile Insurance Co.,3 the
Nebraska Supreme Court restricted the insurer's right to subro-
gation on payment of a loss to its insured.
II. THE FACTS
In October, 1973, Diane Stetina was a passenger in an automobile
struck by a vehicle driven by Vera Lusins. Diane was severely
injured in the accident and her father, the plaintiff, incurred about
$17,800 of medical expenses.
4
At the time of the accident, the plaintiff had first party coverage
under two insurance policies issued by the defendant, State Farm
1. R. KEETON, INSURANCE LAw § 3.1, at 88, 91 (1971).
2. 16 G. CoucH, Couch ON INSURANCE § 61.18, at 248 (2d ed. R. Anderson
1966).
3. 196 Neb. 441, 243 N.W.2d 341 (1976).
4. Id. at 442, 243 N.W.2d at 342. This sum was incurred as of the date
Mr. Stetina filed his amended petition.
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Mutual Automobile Insurance Company. Each policy contained an
insuring agreement designated as "Coverage M-Major Medical
Payments," under which the defendant was to pay 100 per cent of
the first $1,000 of medical expenses incurred by the plaintiff due to
his daughter's injuries and 80 per cent of the expenses over that
amount up to a limit of $5,000. 5 At the time of the accident, State
Farm also provided liability coverage to Vera Lusins, the driver
of the other vehicle, and to her husband. This protection was
limited to $50,000 for bodily injury to one person.
After the accident, the plaintiff's attorneys and an employee
of State Farm negotiated a settlement of $50,000 in satisfaction of
all claims of Diane and her parents against the Lusinses. As part
of the settlement agreement, the plaintiff, either individually as the
parent of Diane or on her behalf as guardian, agreed not to sue
the Lusinses.6
After the settlement, the plaintiff presented Diane's medical
bills to State Farm and demanded $10,000 under the medical pay-
ments coverage of his policies. State Farm denied the claim and
the plaintiff brought suit in the District Court of Lancaster County.
The district court found that the plaintiff had violated the provi-
sions of the insurance policies by entering into the covenant not
to sue the Lusinses and therefore had no right to recover medical
payments. 7 It gave summary judgment for the defendant, State
Farm, and overruled the plaintiff's motion for a new trial. The
plaintiff appealed to the Nebraska Supreme Court which reversed
the judgment of the district court.
III. THE SUPREME COURT DECISION
The Nebraska Supreme Court quoted the "relevant terms" of
the plaintiff's policies with State Farm. The first of these was an
assistance and cooperation clause.8 The second was a subrogation
5. See Record, vol. 1, at 15-29, Stetina v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 196 Neb. 441, 243 N.W.2d 341 (1976) (plaintiffs insurance pol-
icies). The plaintiff's policies each contained two medical payments
insuring agreements, Coverage C and Coverage M. Under Coverage
C, the plaintiff would have been able to obtain medical payments cov-
erage in an amount greater than $5,000 but no protection under that
coverage was purchased. State Farm's limit of liability under Cover-
age M was fixed at $5,000 for each policy. The court's opinion does
not mention the letter designation of the plaintiff's medical payments
coverage although it is important when interpreting the subrogation
provision. See § IV of text inira.
6. 196 Neb. at 442, 243 N.W.2d at 342.
7. Id.
8. Assistance and Cooperation of the Insured. The insured shall
INSURANCE SUBROGATION
provision.9
With no discussion of either provision, the supreme court framed
the issue to be decided: Did the plaintiff, Frank Stetina, by exe-
cuting the covenant not to sue the Lusinses, destroy State Farm's
right of subrogation against the tort-feasor in violation of the terms
of the policies, or did State Farm have no right of subrogation
against the tort-feasor, Mrs. Lusins, because she also was insured
by State Farm? In the latter case, the execution of the covenant
not to sue would not have prejudiced any subrogation rights or
have violated any provision that would preclude recovery under
the policies.'0
The plaintiff conceded that where the tort-feasor is insured by
a different insurance company, or not at all, and the insured
executed a covenant not to sue the tort-feasor, the insurer's right of
subrogation is prejudiced and it is released from liability." But the
court held, that under the circumstances of this case, the agreement
not to sue did not prejudice any subrogation rights of State Farm,
and therefore there was no violation of the policies which would
preclude the plaintiff from recovering under them. In so holding,
the supreme court accepted the contention of the plaintiff that the
defendant, State Farm, possessed no right of subrogation against the
tort-feasor, Mrs. Lusins, because she also was insured by State
Farm.12 The court examined various authorities which all referred
to the basic hornbook law that an insurer cannot recover by right
of subrogation from its own insured. It was in light of these
authorities and "considerations of public policy"'13 that the court
reached its decision.
cooperate with the company, and upon its request, attend
hearings and trials, assist in effecting settlement, securing and
giving evidence, obtaining the attendance of witnesses and in
the conduct of any legal proceedings in connection with the
subject matter of this insurance. The insured shall not, except
at his own cost, voluntarily make any payment assume any
obligation or incur any expense other than for such first aid
to others as shall be imperative at the time of accident.
Id. at 443, 243 N.W.2d at 342.
9. Id. at 443, 243 N.W.2d at 342-43. The subrogation provision which the
court quoted appears in full at the beginning of § IV of the text. When
the court quoted the provision however, it deleted the phrase "except
under coverages C, M, S and T." This deletion caused the provision
to be misleading as quoted by the court, because it was only the sec-
ond paragraph of the provision, not the first, which related to the
plaintiffs claim.
10. Id. at 443-44, 243 N.W.2d at 343.
11. Id. at 444, 243 N.W.2d at 343.
12. Id. at 452, 243 N.W.2d at 347.
13. Id.
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IV. ANALYSIS OF THE DECISION
A. The Subrogation Provision
The full text of the "subrogation"'14 provision as it appeared in
the plaintiff's policies was as follows:
4. Subrogation. Upon payment under this policy except under
coverages C, , S and T, the company shall be subrogated to all
the insured's rights of recovery therefor and the insured shall do
whatever is necessary to secure such rights and do nothing to prej-
udice them.
Upon payment under coverages C and M of this policy the com-
pany shall be subrogated to the extent of such payment to the pro-
ceeds of any settlement or judgment that may result from the
exercise of any rights of recovery which the injured person or
anyone receiving such payment may have against any person or
organization and such person shall execute and deliver instru-
ments and papers and do whatever else is necessary to secure such
rights. Such person shall do nothing after loss to prejudice such
rights.15
Under the first paragraph of this provision, payment by State Farm
under the medical payment coverages 6 was specifically excepted
from those payments that gave it the right to be subrogated to the
insured's rights of recovery. The second paragraph, which dealt
with the company's rights after payment under the medical pay-
ments coverages of the policy, only gave State Farm a right to the
proceeds of any settlement or judgment the insured should receive
to the extent of the payment made.
There was a purpose for the distinction made by State Farm
in drafting its "subrogation" provision. As a general rule, a cause
of action to recover for personal injuries cannot be assigned absent
a statute so allowing. 17 Clauses giving the insurer the right to be
subrogated to the insured's rights of recovery on payment under
the medical payments coverage of an automobile insurance policy
have been interpreted by some courts as constituting assignments
to the insurer of the insureds' causes of action for personal injury.'8
14. Although the State Farm provision was entitled "Subrogation," the
part of it that dealt with the company's rights after payment under
the medical payments coverages (C and M) would have been labeled
more properly as a "right to reimbursement." For convenience, it will
be referred to as a "subrogation" provision.
15. Record, vol. 1, at 20, 28, Stetina v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
196 Neb. 441, 243 N.W.2d 341 (1976).
16. Coverages C and M are the medical payments coverages. See note
5 supra.
17. See Annot., 40 A.L.R.2d 500, 502 (1955).
18. See, e.g., Peller v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 220 Cal. App. 2d 610,
INSURANCE SUBROGATION
Consequently, medical payments subrogation clauses are held void
by these courts.19
Some courts have distinguished an assignment of a cause of ac-
tion for personal injury from an assignment of the right to pro-
ceeds of a settlement or judgment resulting from a personal injury
claim. These courts, although recognizing that a cause -of action
for personal injury cannot be assigned, have upheld the assignment
of the proceeds of a recovery on such claim.20  State Farm appar-
ently recognized that the courts were distinguishing assignments
of causes of action for personal injury from assignments of proceeds
of any recovery obtained. It drafted its policies to imply that its
"subrogation" rights after payment under the medical payments
coverages were not rights against the tort-feasor but rather were
rights to be reimbursed from the proceeds of any settlement or
judgment the insured might obtain.
21
State Farm's efforts resulted in at least partial success. In Cali-
fornia, medical payments subrogation clauses, allowing the insurer
to bring an action against the tort-feasor to recover payments, were
held invalid as assignments of causes of action for personal injury.
22
However, the State Farm clause was approved and State Farm was
allowed reimbursement from proceeds of an insured's recovery from
the tort-feasor.23 Of particular significance to those courts holding
the State Farm "subrogation" clause to be valid was the fact that
the clause gave the insurer rights only to the proceeds of a settle-
ment or judgment that might be obtained, rather than rights
against the tort-feasor.24 However, other courts have refused or
34 Cal. Rptr. 41 (1963); Travelers Indem. Co. v. Chumbley, 394 S.W.2d
418 (Mo. App. 1965).
19. Id. The interpretation of a medical payments subrogation clause
as constituting an assignment of a cause of action for personal injury
is highly questionable. Several other courts have upheld medical
payments subrogation clauses relying on differences between the
concepts of subrogation and assignment. See Annot., 19 A.L.R.3d 1054,
1063 (1968).
20. See Annot., 40 A.L.R.2d 500, 512 (1955).
21. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Pohl, 255 Ore. 46, 49-50, 464
P.2d 321, 323 (1970).
22. Peller v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 220 Cal. App. 2d 610, 34 Cal. Rptr.
41 (1963).
23. West v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 30 Cal. App. 3d 562, 106 Cal.
Rptr. 486 (1973); Lee v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 57 Cal. App. 3d
458, 129 Cal. Rptr. 271 (1976).
24. 30 Cal. App. 3d 562, 565, 106 Cal. Rptr. 486, 488 (1973); 57 Cal. App.
3d 458, 466, 129 Cal. Rptr. 271, 276 (1976). See also State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co. v. Pohl, 255 Ore. 46, 51, 464 P.2d 321, 324 (1970).
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failed to recognize the distinction and have held the clause invalid
as an assignment of a cause of action for personal injury.
25
In addition to the "subrogation" clause discussed above, State
Farm buttressed its policies with a "Trust Agreement" provision.
The "Trust Agreement" provided that if State Farm paid any
person under the medical payments coverages of the policy, it
would be entitled to reimbursement from the proceeds of any settle-
ment or judgment that such person might collect from the tort-
feasor; that all rights of recovery of such person against the tort-
feasor would be held in trust for the company; that such person
would act to secure any rights of recovery and not prejudice them;
that if requested by the company, such person would bring any
necessary action, to recover from the tort-feasor with the company
being reimbursed first out of any recovery for its expenses; and
that such person would execute and deliver to the company any
papers needed to secure the rights and obligations of the person and
the company established under the "Trust Agreement." Frank
Stetina's policies contained this provision although it was not men-
tioned in the supreme court opinion.
2 6
25. See State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Knapp, 107 Ariz. 184, 484 P.2d
180 (1971); State Farm Fire & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Farmers Ins. Exch.,
489 P.2d 480 (Okla. 191).
26. Record, vol. 1, at 20, 28, Stetina v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
196 Neb. 441, 243 N.W.2d 341 (1976).
The full text of the "Trust Agreement" provision contained in the
policies is as follows:
5. Trust Agreement-Coverages C, M and U. In the event of
payment to any person under coverage C, M or U:
(a) the company shall be entitled to the extent of such pay-
ment to the proceeds of any settlement or judgment that
may result from the exercise of any rights of recovery of
such person against any person or organization legally re-
sponsible for the bodily injury because of which such pay-
ment is made;
(b) such person shall hold in trust for the benefit of the
company all rights of recovery which he shall have against
such other person or organization because of the damages
which are the subject of claim made under the coverages;
(c) such person shall do whatever is proper to secure and
shall do nothing after loss to prejudice such rights;
(d) if requested in writing by the company, such person
shall take, through any representative designated by the
company, such action as may be necessary or appropriate
to recover such payment as damages from such other person
or organization, such action to be taken in the name of such
person; in the event of a recovery, the company shall be
reimbursed out of such recovery for expenses, costs and at-
torneys' fees incurred by it in connection therewith;
(e) Such person shall execute and deliver to the company
such instruments and papers as may be appropriate to se-
INSURANCE SUBROGATION
The effect of such a trust agreement provision in an insurance
policy is to give the insurer essentially the same rights as under a
subrogation clause. 27 If there is any reason for distinguishing a
clause which states that the insurer will be subrogated to all of the
insured's rights of recovery, from one that merely allows the insurer
reimbursement from the proceeds of any recovery, such a distinc-
tion should not be made where a clause of the latter type is accom-
panied by a trust agreement provision such as that in Frank
Stetina's policies. In Missouri, where medical payments subro-
gation clauses have been held void as assignments of causes of
action for personal injury,28 similar trust agreement provisions have
also been held invalid.29 However, in California, one court upheld
the State Farm medical payments "subrogation" clause giving the
insurer the right to reimbursement from the proceeds of any re-
covery, even though it was accompanied by a trust agreement pro-
vision identical to that in the Stetina policies.30 Two justices of
that court did question the validity of the clauses noting that
"[t] he cumulative effect of the policy provisions is to create the
economic reality of subrogation to the personal injury claim with-
out its language." 3' 1
The Nebraska Supreme Court's opinion in Stetina did not discuss
the medical payments "subrogation" provision in the plaintiff's
policies. Holding that the plaintiff had not prejudiced State Farm's
rights by agreeing not to sue the Lusinses because the "no subro-
cure the rights and obligations of such person and the com-
pany established by this provision.
Id.
27. For example, where an insurer pays for only part of the loss and ob-
tains subrogation rights for that amount, the cause of action remains
with the insured and it is brought in his name. The subrogated in-
surer is allowed to participate in the prosecution of the action and re-
alize on its subrogation rights by sharing in the proceeds of the recov-
ery. See Krause v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 184 Neb. 588, 169
N.W.2d 601 (1969); United Servs. Auto. Ass'n v. Hills, 172 Neb. 128, 109
N.W.2d 174 (1961). The Nebraska Supreme Court apparently has
held that where the insurer pays only part of the loss, it has no
independent claim against the tort-feasor. See Schmidt v. Henke,
192 Neb. 408, 222 N.W.2d 114 (1974). These are essentially the same
rights the State Farm policy gives the company upon payment under
the medical payments coverages and in effect State Farm is subro-
gated to the insured's rights of recovery.
28. Travelers Indem. Co. v. Chumbley, 394 S.W.2d 418 (Mo. App. 1965).
29. See Jones v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 497 S.W.2d 809 (Mo. App. 1973);
Bailey v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 497 S.W.2d 816 (Mo. App. 1973).
30. Lee v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 57 Cal. App. 3d 458, 129 Cal. Rptr.
271 (1976).
31. Id. at 470, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 278 (concurring opinion).
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gation against insured" rule prevented State Farm from having any
rights against Mrs. Lusins, the court apparently interpreted the pol-
icies to give State Farm subrogation rights against the tort-feasor
rather than merely a right of reimbursement from the proceeds of
any recovery. Because the policies contained the "Trust Agree-
ment" provision, this was probably the proper interpretation.
32
From the Stetina decision, it appears that the Nebraska Supreme
Court will refuse to hold invalid a medical payments subrogation
provision as an assignment of a cause of action for personal injury"3
even if the provision is worded to provide that the insurer will be
subrogated to the insured's rights of recovery against the tort-feasor
rather than in terms of reimbursement from the proceeds of any
recovery. Therefore, the court's interpretation of the policy pro-
visions as giving the insurer subrogation rights against the tort-
feasor is of no significance to the issue of whether such clauses will
be valid in Nebraska. Were Nebraska one of those states where
medical payments subrogation is considered to be an assignment
of a cause of action for personal injury, such an interpretation
would be crucial to the validity of such provisions.
The court's interpretation of the policy provisions as providing
for subrogation against the tort-feasor is important to the outcome
of Stetina. Had the Nebraska court interpreted the provisions of
the plaintiff's policies as merely providing State Farm with a right
of reimbursement from the proceeds of any recovery the plaintiff
might obtain, there would have been no need to determine whether
the "no subrogation against insured" rule applied to prevent State
Farm from being subrogated against Mrs. Lusins. Under such an
interpretation, State Farm would not have any subrogation rights
against Vera Lusins whether she was insured by State Farm or
not.8
4
32. By failing to mention the letter designation of the plaintiff's medical
payments coverage under his policies and to quote fully the "subroga-
tion" provision, see note 9 supra, the supreme court conveniently
avoided having to deal directly with the issue of whether the State
Farm policy gives the insurer subrogation rights against the tort-feasor
or merely a right to reimbursement from the proceeds of any recovery.
Notwithstanding this, the ultimate interpretation of the policy provi-
sion by the court is quite clear.
33. For a collection of cases in which medical payments subrogation pro-
visions were held valid, see Annot., 19 A.L.R.3d 1054, 1063 (1968).
34. In such a case the court would have to decide how much State Farm
is obligated to pay under the medical payments coverages of the plain-
tiff's policies. This obligation to pay would depend on the extent State
Farm would be entitled to reimbursement for payments made from
the proceeds of the recovery obtained by the plaintiff. That is, if the
court were to determine that State Farm would be entitled to full
INSURANCE SUBROGATION
B. The No Subrogation Against Insured Rule
The rule that an insurer cannot recover by right of subrogation
from its own insured generally has been accepted by those courts
that have considered it. Applying the rule literally, one may reach
the same conclusion as did the Nebraska Supreme Court-that the
defendant, State Farm, would not be entitled to be subrogated to
any claims of Frank Stetina against Vera Lusins or her husband,
because the Lusinses were insured under an automobile liability
insurance policy issued by State Farm. But an examination of the
rule, in light of the policy behind it, makes clear that the rule
should not apply to prevent State Farm from being subrogated to
such claims against the Lusinses under the circumstances of this
case.
Professor Keeton states the rule and the policy behind it, as
follows:
Allowing an insurer to be subrogated to rights against an "insured"
on account of a payment of benefits under the coverage with re-
spect to which the person is an "insured" would have the effect of
withdrawing insurance benefits. Accordingly, it is generally stated
that an insurer cannot have subrogation against its own "in-
sured."3 5
Of course, it would not be fair to allow an insurer, after it has
provided coverage to an insured for a loss, to collect from the in-
sured any moneys paid by it under the coverage on the occurrence
of that loss. This policy behind the rule is evidenced by several
court opinions.36
Application of the rule would be proper where the insured from
whom the insurer attempts to recover is a named insured under
the same policy on which the insurer has paid, or is an additional
insured,3 7 or is anyone for whose benefit the policy has been
written. 38 If State Farm had attempted to recover from Vera
reimbursement from the settlement obtained by the plaintiff, it would
not owe the plaintiff any amount under his policy because any pay-
ment made would have to be given back.
35. R. KEMroN, supra note 1, § 4.2(b), at 187 (emphasis added).
36. See, e.g., Federal Ins. Co. v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc., 117 F.2d 794,
796 (5th Cir. 1941); Mattera v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 38 Misc. 2d 256, 235
N.Y.S.2d 89 (1962); Chenoweth Motor Co. v. Cotton, 2 Ohio Misc. 123,
207 N.E.2d 412 (1965); General Ins. Co. of America v. Stoddard Wendle
Ford Motors, 67 Wash. 2d 973, 979, 410 P.2d 904, 908 (1966).
37. See Pendlebury v. Western Cas. & Sur. Co., 89 Idaho 456, 468, 406
P.2d 129, 136 (1965); Miller v. Kujak, 4 Wis. 2d 80, 85-86, 90 N.W.2d
137, 140 (1958).
38. See General Ins. Co. of America v. Stoddard Wendle Ford Motors, 67
Wash. 2d 973, 410 P.2d 904 (1966).
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Lusins as tort-feasor the $50,000 it had paid to Frank Stetina under
the Lusinses' policy, the "no subrogation against insured" rule prop-
erly would have prevented such action. In such instances, allow-
ing subrogation by the insurer against the insured clearly would
have the effect of withdrawing the insurance benefits purchased.
But these situations are markedly different from that in Stetina.
In Stetina, Vera Lusins, at the time of the accident, was an in-
sured under an automobile liability insurance policy issued by State
Farm, distinct and separate from the plaintiff's policies. Her policy
provided her with liability coverage and protection in the amount
of $50,000 for bodily injury to one person and State Farm was not
liable on that policy for any amount above $50,000 that Vera Lusins
might have become legally obligated to pay because of injury to
one person.3 9 Vera Lusins was not an insured under the plaintiff's
policies with State Farm and the coverage afforded under those
policies was not for her benefit. To allow State Farm to be subro-
gated to the rights of the plaintiff against Vera Lusins to recover
payments made under the plaintiff's policies would not have the
effect of withdrawing Mrs. Lusins's insurance benefits.
An example will illustrate how an insurer can be subrogated
to rights against a person who has an insurance policy with it and
still fulfill its contractual obligations under the policy by providing
the insured with all the protection purchased. Suppose that Person
A has a liability insurance policy with Company X which provides
coverage up to $50,000. A negligently starts a fire which destroys
Person B's home worth $100,000. B also has an insurance policy
with Company X which covers loss to B's dwelling caused by fire
up to $100,000.40 B's policy provides that X, upon payment under
the policy, will be subrogated to B's right of recovery against any
party responsible for the loss. Upon payment to B, Company X
should be allowed to be subrogated to B's rights against A for
$100,000. Any judgment obtained by X against A would be reduced
by $50,000, the amount of liability coverage and protection prom-
ised by X to A. A would receive all the liability protection he
purchased and X would be giving all the protection it contracted
for-$50,000 to A and $100,000 to B with the right to recover what
it can from the tort-feasor.
Consider the result when the "no subrogation against insured"
rule, as interpreted by the supreme court in Stetina, is applied to
the above example. On payment to B of the $100,000 of insurance
39. See 15 G. CoucH, supra note 2, § 56.41, at 708.
40. A typical "Homeowners" insurance policy provides protection for both
personal liability and fire loss.
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benefits, X would not be allowed to be subrogated to B's rights
against A to recover the amount paid. X contracted for that right
and had A been insured by another insurer, or not at all, X would
have been subrogated to B's rights and might have been able to
recover from A some of the money paid to B.
41
If B were satisfied with the $100,000 payment from X and took
no further action, it might be said that A in effect received $100,000
of liability protection for the price of $50,000. He at least received
a windfall of being absolved of further liability. But assume that
B brings suit against A for the damage caused. Denying the insurer
subrogation rights against the tort-feasor insured would not
prevent the claimant insured from proceeding against him. Under
the collateral source rule, the amount paid by X to B under B's
insurance policy could not be used to reduce the liability of A to
B and B could obtain a judgment against A for $100,000.42 X, as
liability insurer of A, would have to pay $50,000 of that judgment
to B. If B could collect the remaining $50,000 from A, he would
receive $200,000 for a $100,000 loss with $150,000 being paid by X.
Under these circumstances, Company X would pay three times the
total net amount that would have been paid out by insurance com-
panies had A and B been insured by different companies and B
would receive twice as much as he would have otherwise.43 Al-
lowing X to be subrogated to B's rights against A in such a situation
would not leave the tort-feasor insured, A, any worse off but would
prevent double recovery by the claimant insured, B. Also, the net
payout by the insurance industry would equal the amount that
would have been paid had A and B been insured by different com-
panies.
The facts of the Stetina case can illustrate how the application
of the "no subrogation against insured" rule, as interpreted by the
41. At least one writer suggests that subrogation recoveries do enter the
rate structure and that the insurer actually is being paid to take the
risk of loss less net subrogation recoveries. See R. HorN, SUBROGATiON
IN INsURANcE TEoRy mm PRACTICE 25 (1964). If this is true, the de-
nial of subrogation rights would result in the insurer being required
to take a greater risk than the premium charge would cover. But see
E. PATTERSON, ESSENTIALS or INsURANCE LAw 151 (2d ed. 1957).
42. See Huenink v. Collins, 181 Neb. 195, 147 N.W.2d 50o (1966).
43. Had A and B been insured by different companies, the insurer of B
would be allowed to be subrogated to B's rights against A. The
$100,000 recovery from A would reimburse B's insurer leaving a total
net payout by it of zero. A's insurer would be obligated to pay
$50,000 of the $100,000 judgment against A and it would not be able
to recover any of that amount. B will have received $100,000 for a
$100,000 loss with $50,000 being paid by A and $50,000 by A's insurer.
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Nebraska Supreme Court, can lead to an inequitable result. As-
sume that the total loss to the plaintiff and his daughter that Vera
Lusins was liable for was $50,000.44 Assume further that State Farm
paid the plaintiff the $10,000 it owned him under the medical pay-
ments coverages of his policies. The plaintiff then could bring suit
against Mrs. Lusins and recover $50,000 which would be paid by
State Farm under the policy purchased by the Lusinses. Under
the supreme court's interpretation of the rule, State Farm would
have no subrogation rights and would not be entitled to any of
the recovery obtained by the plaintiff. Thus, State Farm would
be paying $60,000 to the plaintiff for a $50,000 loss.
A proper result would be reached by allowing State Farm to
have subrogation rights against the Lusinses even though they were
insured under a policy it issued. State Farm, on paying the $10,000
medical payments benefits to Frank Stetina, would be subrogated
to his rights against Mrs. Lusins to the extent of the payment
made.45 Any recovery from Mrs. Lusins, up to $50,000, would be
paid by State Farm, fulfilling its obligation under the insurance
policy issued to the Lusineses. In allocating the proceeds of a
$50,000 recovery, the plaintiff would receive $40,000 and State Farm
would be entitled to the remaining $10,000.46 Thus, the Lusinses
44. The court in Stetina did not indicate what the total loss resulting from
the accident may have been. The court did state that the plaintiff
had incurred about $17,800 in medical expenses as of the date of filing
of the amended petition. From this, it may be surmised that the total
loss to the plaintiff and his daughter well exceeded $50,000.
45. Such action might present conflict of interest problems. But see text
accompanying notes 55-57 infra.
46. Professor Keeton sets forth five rules, all of which have been urged
at one time or another as the correct method of allocating the proceeds
of a recovery from the tort-feasor between the insured and an insurer:
First Rule: The insurer is the sole beneficial owner of the
claim against the third party and is entitled to the full amount
recovered, whether or not it exceeds the amount paid by the
insurer to the insured.
Second Rule: The insurer is to be reimbursed first out of
the recovery from the third party, and the insured is entitled
to any remaining balance.
Third Rule: The recovery from the third person is to be
prorated between the insurer and the insured in accordance
with the percentage of the original loss for which the insurer
paid the insured under the policy.
Fourth Rule: Out of the recovery from the third party the
insured is to be reimbursed first, for the loss not covered by
insurance, and the insurer is entitled to any remaining bal-
ance, up to a sum sufficient to reimburse the insurer fully,
the insured being entitled to anything beyond that. Thus, if
there is any windfall, it goes to the insured.
Fifth Rule: The insured is the sole owner of the claim
against the third party and is entitled to the full amount re-
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would have received the full liability protection they had purchased
from State Farm, the Stetinas would have been fully compensated
for their loss, and State Farm would have paid out the same total
net amount that would have been paid out by insurers had the
plaintiff and the Lusinses been insured by different companies. 47
The supreme court also stated that it based its decision that State
Farm had no right of subrogation against the tort-feasor, on "con-
siderations of public policy."48 The court's discussion of public pol-
icy was limited to a quote from a Montana case, Home Insurance
Co. v. Pinski Brothers, Inc.: 
49
To permit the insurer to sue its own insured for a liability cov-
ered by the insurance policy would violate these basic equity prin-
ciples, as well as violate sound public policy. Such action, if per-
mitted, would (1) allow the insurer to expend premiums collected
from its insured to secure a judgment against the same insured
on a risk insured against; (2) give judicial sanction to the breach
of the insurance policy by the insurer; (3) permit the insurer to
secure information from its insured under the guise of policy
provisions available for later use in the insurer's subrogation
against its own insured; (4) allow the insurer to take advantage
of its conduct and conflict of interest with its insured; and (5)
constitute judicial approval of a breach of the insurer's relation-
ship with its own insured.5 0
covered, whether or not the total thus received from the third
party and the insurer exceeds his loss. This rule is a rejection
of subrogation. It is in effect the rule applied to types of in-
surance under which subrogation is customarily disallowed-
for example, life insurance.
R. KEETON, supra note 1, § 3.10 (c), at 160-62 (footnotes omitted).
The Nebraska Supreme Court never has specifically adopted any
of these rules as the method to be used although it is clear that neither
the first nor the fifth rule will be applied. See United Serv. Auto.
Ass'n v. Hills, 172 Neb. 128, 109 N.W.2d 174 (1961); Krause v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 184 Neb. 588, 169 N.W.2d 601 (1969). Where
there is a recovery in. full, application of rules two, three, and four
as to the method of allocation produce the same result; that is, under
the example in the text, $40,000 to the insured and $10,000 to the in-
surer.
Where there is a recovery which is less than full, which usually
occurs where there is a settlement, the fourth rule, that of reimbursing
the insured first, has the greatest amount of support in precedent. See
R. KEETON, supra note 1, § 3.10 (c), at 164.
47. Had different insurers been involved, the plaintiff's insurer clearly
would have had subrogation rights and would have been reimbursed
fully for the $10,000 it paid the plaintiff under the medical payments
coverages of his policies from the $50,000 obtained from the Lusinses'
insurer.
48. 196 Neb. at 452, 243 N.W.2d at 347.
49. 160 Mont. 219, 500 P.2d 945 (1972).
50. 196 Neb. at 451, 243 N.W.2d at 346 (quoting Home Ins. Co. v. Pinski
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It is true that allowing an insurer to be subrogated against one
who is insured under a policy issued by it may raise some problems.
One concern of the Stetina court appeared to be that subrogation
by the insurer against one insured by it would be a breach of the
insurance policy by the insurer. But subrogation by the insurer
against an insured does not necessarily involve a breach of the pol-
icy. The insurer can still fulfill its contractual undertaking to pay
any amount up to the policy limits that the insured may become
legally obligated to pay.51 Also, although under most liability in-
surance policies the insurer has an obligation to defend certain
actions brought against the insured,52 this obligation can be fulfilled
where it would otherwise cause conflict of interests problems by the
insured hiring his own attorney and the insurer reimbursing him for
the fees.
53
The supreme court also seemed to be concerned that allowing
subrogation against Vera Lusins would permit State Farm to take
advantage of its conflict of interest with her. The court did not
indicate how State Farm would do this. Similar conflict of inter-
est problems arise when one insurance company has insured two
automobiles involved in a collision and the drivers bring suit against
each other. The conflict that could arise by allowing the insurer
to control both sides of the litigation is resolved by having at least
one of the parties retain his own attorney.
54
As to the argument that allowing subrogation by an insurer
against an insured would permit the insurer to obtain information
from the insured for later use against him under the guise of policy
provisions, it should be noted that it has been held that the insured
need not comply with the provisions of a cooperation clause in the
insurance policy if the insurer had conflicting interests.55 Similar
Bros., 160 Mont. 219, 225-26, 500 P.2d 945, 949 (1972)) (emphasis sup-
plied by Nebraska Supreme Court).
51. See § IV B of text supra.
52. R. KEEToN, supra note 1, § 7.6 (a), at 462.
53. See O'Morrow v. Borad, 27 Cal. 2d 794, 167 P.2d 483 (1946). See also
Babcock & Wilcox Co. v. Parsons Corp., 430 F.2d 531, 538 (8th Cir.
1970).
The court also was concerned that allowing subrogation in such in-
stances would be allowing the insurer to expend premiums collected
from its insured to secure a judgment against the same insured on
a risk assumed. Although it is impossible to determine where every
premium goes, it would seem that if the insurer pays for the costs
of the insured's defense and for his liability up to the policy limits,
the insurer will have used every premium that the insured has paid
and more.
54. See O'Morrow v. Borad, 27 Cal. 2d 794, 167 P.2d 483 (1946).
55. Id.
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equitable relief may be granted to relieve the insured of compliance
with other policy provisions if such compliance would result in the
insurer obtaining information from the insured that may be later
used against him. If the insurer did obtain information from the
insured and attempted to use the information against him under
inequitable circumstances, the court could refuse to allow the in-
surer to be subrogated against that insured by invoking one of the
equitable doctrines5 6 stated in Home Insurance Co. v. Pinski
Brothers, Inc., and quoted by the Stetina court: "One who seeks
equity must do equity,. .. One who seeks equity must come into
court with clean hands, . 'No one can take advantage of his own
w rong.' ,57
It should be noted that the public policy considerations stated
by the Montana court as grounds for denying subrogation against
an insured, and on which the Stetina court relied, were based on
the assumption that the insurer will bring suit against the tort-
feasor insured to enforce its subrogation rights. But it is not nec-
essary for the insurer to participate in an action against the tort-
feasor in order to realize on its subrogation rights. On payment
to the insured, the subrogated insurer will be allowed reimburse-
ment from the proceeds of the recovery obtained by the insured
from the tort-feasor even though it failed to assist in the prosecution
of the action.58 In situations such as Stetina, where the insurer's
subrogation rights involve an amount of money substantially less
than what it would have to pay were the tort-feasor insured found
liable, the insurer would not wish to enforce its subrogation rights
by bringing suit. The claimant insured could still bring suit 59 and
if he obtained a judgment and recovery, the insurer should be al-
lowed to realize on its subrogation rights just as in cases where
the tort-feasor was insured by a different company.
60
56. Although the State Farm policy included an express subrogation pro-
vision and therefore conventional subrogation was involved, it has
been held that whether a right has its source in legal or in conven-
tional subrogation, its enforcement is still subject to equitable princi-
ples. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Foundation Reserve Ins.
Co., Inc., 7a N.M. 359, 363, 431 P.2d 737, 741 (1967); Castleman Constr.
v. Pennington, 222 Tenn. 82, 96-97, 432 S.W.2d 669, 676 (1968). The
court in Stetina apparently agreed.
57. 196 Neb. at 450, 243 N.W.2d at 346 (quoting Home Ins. Co. v. Pinski
Bros., 160 Mont. 219, 225, 500 P.2d 945, 949 (1972)).
58. Krause v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 184 Neb. 588, 169 N.W.2d
601 (1969).
59. It would seem that the insurer should be allowed to defend the tort-
feasor insured as long as there were no conflict of interest problems.
Some might argue that where the insurer works to prevent recovery
it should not be allowed to share in the proceeds of that recovery.
60. See Norris v. Allstate Ins. Co., 293 So. 2d 918 (La. App. 1974).
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As the quotation from Professor Keeton points out,," the "no
subrogation against insured" rule can only be applied absolutely
in situations where the insurer attempts to recover from an insured
money paid under a coverage that provides protection for that in-
sured. Only in such situations would subrogation by the insurer
against the insured have the effect of withdrawing insurance bene-
fits purchased. 62 In other situations, a court should proceed on a
case-by-case basis, deciding whether or not to allow subrogation by
determining whether the insured will still obtain the benefits con-
tracted for and whether the insurer acted fairly and equitably. The
application of the rule to all situations where the insurer is seeking
to be subrogated against one who happens to be insured by it would
deny an important right to the insurer where such a denial is not
necessary. 63 The "no subrogation against insured" rule was not ap-
plicable to the situation in Stetina, and it should not have been
relied on by the court in reaching its decision that State Farm was
not prejudiced by the plaintiff's agreement not to sue the Lusinses.
64
61. See text accompanying note 35 supra.
62. In Connor v. Thompson Constr. & Dev. Co., 166 N.W.2d 109 (Iowa
1969) (cited by the court in Stetina as authority for the general rule
that an insurer cannot recover by right of subrogation from its own
insured), the Iowa Supreme Court apparently recognized that the rule
could not be applied absolutely to prevent subrogation by the insurer
in all instances. In Connor, the owners of a house were deemed to
be insurers of the contractors because they had breached an agreement
which required them to obtain insurance covering loss to the structure
by fire. The insurance policy was to name the contractor and all sub-
contractors as insureds. A fire, allegedly caused by the negligence of
the contractors, destroyed the residence. Relying on the no subroga-
tion against insured rule, the court held that the owners could not re-
cover from the contractors for damage caused to the structure since
they were the insurers of the contractors for that loss. But the court
also held that nothing prevented the owners from recovering from the
contractors for other losses caused by the fire.
63. An example of this is Home Ins. Co. v. Pinski Bros., 160 Mont. 219,
500 P.2d 945 (1972). In Pinski, a boiler explosion resulted in a
$135,000 loss to a hospital. The hospital had insurance with the Home
Insurance Co. which paid the loss and claimed subrogation rights
against the architects who were allegedly responsible. The architects
had liability insurance coverage to the extent of $25,000 also with the
Home Insurance Co. They tendered defense of the action to the insur-
ance company which refused the tender and subsequently hired their
own attorneys. Relying on the no subrogation against insured rule,
the Montana Supreme Court gave summary judgment in favor of the
architects on the insurance company's subrogation claim against them
thereby denying the insurance company a possible $110,000 recovery
of the insurance proceeds paid by them.
64. It is true that Home Ins. Co. v. Pinski Bros., 160 Mont. 219, 500 P.2d
945 (1972), and Dupre v. Vedrine, 261 So. 2d 288 (La. App. 1972), both
support the holding of the court in Stetina that the "no subrogation
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V. WAIVER OF SUBROGATION RIGHTS?
Under the particular facts of Stetina, arguably, the plaintiff
should have been allowed to recover under the medical payments
coverages of his policies even though he released the Lusinses from
further liability. When Frank Stetina executed the covenant not to
sue, a State Farm agent was present and apparently negotiated the
covenant.65 State Farm, through its agent, could have protected
itself from further action by the plaintiff by obtaining an agree-
ment from Stetina that he would not hold State Farm liable under
the medial payments coverages of his policies.6 6 State Farm's fail-
ure to get such an agreement, along with its participation and ac-
quiescence in the settlement between the Lusinses and Stetina,
could constitute a waiver of its subrogation rights.6 7 Thus, State
Farm still would be obligated to pay the plaintiff the benefits af-
forded under the medical payments coverages of his policies.
6 8
If similar situations occur in the future, insurers may remember
Stetina and try to obtain an agreement from the claimant insured
that he will not recover under the provisions of his policy. Such
a situation could present a conflict of interests between the insurer
against insured" rule prevented State Farm from having any subroga-
tion rights against Vera Lusins. For the same reasons it has been ar-
gued that the holding of the court in Stetina was not proper. It may
also be argued that the holdings of the courts in Pinski and Dupre
were not proper. It is interesting to note that the Louisiana Court
of Appeal in a later case, Norris v. Allstate Ins. Co., 293 So. 2d 918
(La. App. 1974), allowed the insurer to realize on its subrogation
rights even though the tort-feasor was also insured by the insurer. The
court distinguished the Dupre case on the fact that in Norris Allstate
had a subrogation clause in its policy and therefore conventional sub-
rogation was involved, whereas the insurer in Dupre was relying on
legal subrogation. The court in Stetina cites Norris as "clarifying"
Dupre. 196 Neb. at 449, 243 N.W.2d at 345.
65. 196 Neb. at 442, 243 N.W.2d at 342.
66. There is no indication in the Stetina opinion as to why State Farm
did not obtain such an agreement. One may speculate that it believed
the provisions of the plaintiff's policies adequately would protect it
from having to pay under them and therefore felt it to be unnecessary
to obtain a release from the plaintiff.
67. See Tarzian v. West Bend Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 74 Ill. App. 2d 314, 325-
27, 221 N.E.2d 293, 299 (1966); Weber v. United Hardware & Imple-
ment Muts. Co., 75 N.D. 581, 31 N.W.2d 456 (1948); Runner v. Calvert
Fire Ins. Co., 138 W. Va. 369, 76 S.E.2d 244 (1953).
68. Such a result would be equitable if Diane Stetina's injuries amounted
to $60,000 or more. In such a situation, had State Farm first paid the
plaintiff the $10,000 owed under the medical payments coverages and
then obtained a $50,000 settlement from the Lusinses, under the ma-
jority rule of allocation, see note 46 supra, the plaintiff would be
entitled to the full amount recovered from the tort-feasor.
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and the insured it represents. If the claimant insured is to be pre-
cluded from recovering under his own policies, he may insist on
an increase in the settlement amount. If such an increase would
raise the settlement to a figure above the policy limits of the tort-
feasor insured, the insurer will be inclined to consent to it because
the company would reduce its total liability. Of course, the tort-
feasor insured will be worse off because he would have to make
up at least part of the increase in the settlement amount. In such
a situation, the courts should protect the insureds' interests by
holding the insurer to a standard of good faith and ordinary care
in negotiating the settlement.6 9 An insured should be allowed to
obtain his own attorney to represent his interests whenever the
claim against him exceeds his policy limits.
70
VI. CONCLUSION
In holding that State Farm could not have any subrogation
rights against Vera Lusins because she also happened to be insured
by it, the Nebraska Supreme Court unnecessarily restricted the sub-
rogation rights of insurers. Where subrogation is denied, those ob-
jectives that subrogation serves are not attained. Consequently, if
the "no subrogation against insured" rule is interpreted to prevent
an insurer from ever having subrogation rights against one insured
by it, situations may occur where the claimant insured is allowed
double recovery or where the tort-feasor insured receives the wind-
fall of being absolved of liability, both at the expense of the insurer.
John A. Selzer '77
69. See R. KEETON, supra note 1, § 7.8(b), at 510-11 (1971).
70. See id. § 7.6(d) at 483 (1971).
